OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism

ISBN : 9780199764037

参考価格(税込): 
¥16,643
著者: 
Derk Pereboom
ページ
208 ページ
フォーマット
Hardcover
サイズ
159 x 239 mm
刊行日
2011年05月
シリーズ
Philosophy of the Mind
メール送信
印刷

In this book, Derk Pereboom explores how physicalism might best be formulated and defended against the best anti-physicalist arguments. Two responses to the knowledge and conceivability arguments are set out and developed. The first exploits the open possibility that introspective representations fail to represent mental properties as they are in themselves; specifically, that introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, which these properties might actually lack. The second response draws on the proposal that currently unknown fundamental intrinsic properties provide categorical bases for known physical properties and would also yield an account of consciousness. While there are non-physicalist versions of this position, some are amenable to physicalism. The book's third theme is a defense of a nonreductive account of physicalism. The type of nonreductivism endorsed departs from others in that it rejects all token identity claims for psychological and microphysical entities. The deepest relation between the mental and the microphysical is constitution, where this relation is not to be explicated by the notion of identity.

目次: 

Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. The Knowledge Argument and Introspective Inaccuracy
2. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
3. Conceivability Arguments and Qualitative Inaccuracy
4. Qualitative Inaccuracy and Recent Challenges to Conceivability Arguments
5. Russellian Monism I
6. Russellian Monism II
7. Robust Nonreductive Physicalism
8. Mental Compositional Properties
Bibliography
Index

著者について: 

Derk Pereboom is Professor of Philosophy, Cornell University

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