OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz: Volume II: Information and Economic Analysis: Applications to Capital, Labor, and Product Markets

ISBN : 9780199533718

参考価格(税込): 
¥21,912
著者: 
Joseph E. Stiglitz
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904 ページ
フォーマット
Hardcover
サイズ
178 x 252 mm
刊行日
2013年02月
シリーズ
Selected Works of Joseph E. Stiglitz
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This is the second of six volumes in a series of selected scientific papers by one of the world's most distinguished economists. Volume I presented the basic concepts in the Economics of Information, showing that markets in which information was imperfect or asymmetric (where some individuals know things that others don't) behave markedly different from how they would if information were perfect. Volume II, with papers written between 1969 and 2009, explores the implications of the New Information Paradigm for labor, capital, and product markets. This New Paradigm, for which Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001, has fundamentally changed the way we think about every aspect of economics, raising new questions on corporate governance, and leading us to reconsider old questions on corporate finance, the relationship between finance and the economy, and the theory of economic incentives. While this volume focuses on the application of basic principles, it also extends the theory in important ways, showing the fruitfulness of Stiglitz's research strategy. In doing so, the papers set the ground for questioning some prevailing doctrines: key market phenomena cannot be explained by markets with rational expectations, even when information is imperfect. It demonstrates that how societies organize the obtainment, processing, and transmitting of information is as important as how they organize the production and distribution of goods. Indeed, the two issues are inseparable. The papers thus lay the foundations of a New Institutional Economics, not only describing how institutions (like sharecropping or banks) work and affect resource allocations, but why they arise and take on particular forms.

目次: 

Preface to Volume II
I: SURVEYS AND PERSPECTIVES
Introduction
1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective
2. Information and Competition
II: CAPITAL MARKETS
IIA: INFORMATION AND CAPITAL MARKETS
Introduction
3. Information and Capital Markets
4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading
5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets
6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale
7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. Gale
IIB: CREDIT AND EQUITY RATIONING
Introduction
8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss
9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss
10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann
IIC: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Introduction
11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald
12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss
13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment
14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey
15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz
16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. Edlin
III: INFORMATION AND LABOR MARKETS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF INCENTIVES
IIIA: INCENTIVES
Introduction
17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives
18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy
19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff
20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing
IIIB: EFFICIENCY WAGES
Introduction
21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model
22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model
23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. Rodriguez
IIIC: WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS, SEARCH, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
Introduction
24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution
25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott
IV. THE PURE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE
Introduction
26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard
27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott
28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. Arnott
V. INFORMATION AND PRODUCT MARKETS
Introduction
29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets
30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop
31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information
32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?

著者について: 

Joseph E. Stiglitz is the winner of the 2001 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, and a lead author of the 1995 report of the IPCC, which shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. He was chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton and chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank for 1997-2000. Prior to Columbia he held the Drummond Professorship at All Souls College, Oxford, and professorships at Yale, Stanford, and Princeton. He is the author of the best-selling Globalization and Its Discontents, Making Globalization Work, Fair Trade For All, and most recently of Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the Global Economy. His engagement with Africa began more than 40 years ago, at the Institute of Development Studies in Nairobi.

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