ISBN : 9780199367955
Motivational internalism-the idea that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation-is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it provides a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality. Versions of internalism have potential implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on more detailed conceptions of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as problems for non-cognitivists. This volume's thirteen new essays and introduction are meant to help readers appreciate state-of-the-art of research on internalism, to identify connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen discussion of a number of central aspects of metaethics. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades, while the book's three main sections focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice, respectively.
1 Motivational internalism: Contemporary debates
Gunnar Bjornsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francen Olinder, John Eriksson, Fredrik Bjorklund
Introduction to Part I: Evidence for and against motivational internalism
2 Evaluative judgements, judgments about reasons, and motivations
3 Motivational externalism: Formulation, methodology, rationality and indifference
4 An empirical case for motivational internalism
5 Unconditional motivational internalism and Hume's lesson
6 What's required for motivation by principle?
Introduction to Part II: The relevance of motivational internalism
7 Internalism: Cui bono?
8 Pure expressivism and motivational internalism
9 Can reasons fundamentalism answer the normative question?
10 Naturalistic Moral Realism and Motivational Internalism, From Negative to Positive
III. Bridging the gap
Introduction to part III: Bridging the gap between internalism and externalism
11 Detecting value with motivational responses
12 Intuition and belief in moral motivation
13 Tempered internalism and the participatory stance
14 Two functions of moral language: Rethinking the amoralist
John Thomas Mumm