ISBN : 9780198732570
Our mental lives are entwined with the world. There are worldly things that we have beliefs about and things in the world we desire to have happen. We find some things fearsome and others likable. The puzzle of intentionality -- how it is that our minds make contact with the world -- is one of the oldest and most vexed issues facing philosophers. Many contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists have been attracted to the idea that our minds represent the world. This book explores an important assumption about representation, namely, that when we represent things in the world, we represent them as having properties, and in this way our representations have propositional structure. The contributors examine what the commitment to propositionalism amounts to; illuminate why one might find the thesis attractive (or unattractive); and consider ways in which one might depart from propositionalism. The hope is that this will lead towards a more complete understanding of how the mi
1 Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague: Non-Propositional Intentionality: An Introduction
2 Why Maps Are Not Propositional: Why Maps Are Not Propositional
3 Marcel den Dikken, Richard Larson, Peter Ludlow: Intensional Transitive Verbs and Abstract Clausal Complements
4 Katalin Farkas: Know-How and Non-Propositional Intentionality
5 Graeme Forbes: Content and Theme in Attitude Ascriptions
6 Alex Grzankowski: A Relational Theory of Non-Propositional Attitudes
7 Mark Johnston: Sensory Disclosure: Neither a Propositional, Nor a Factive, Attitude
8 Uriah Kriegel: Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?
9 Angela Mendelovici: Propositionalism without Propositions, Objectualism without Objects
10 Mark Sainsbury: Attitudes on Display
11 John R. Searle: Are There Non-Propositional Intentional States?
12 Sebastian Watzl: Is Attention a Non-Propositional Attitude?