The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity

ISBN : 9780199657889

Daniel Star
1120 ページ
171 x 246 mm
Oxford Handbooks

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity maps a central terrain of philosophy, and provides an authoritative guide to it. Few concepts have received as much attention in recent philosophy as the concept of a reason to do or believe something. And one of the most contested ideas in philosophy is normativity, the 'ought' in claims that we ought to do or believe something. This is the first volume to provide broad coverage of the study of reasons and normativity across multiple philosophical subfields. In addition to focusing on reasons in ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, action, and language, the Handbook explores philosophical work on the nature of normativity in general. Topics covered include: the unity of normativity; the fundamentality of reasons; attempts to explain reasons in other terms; the relation of motivational reasons to normative reasons; the internalist constraint; the logic and language of reasons and 'ought'; connections between reasons, in


Daniel Star: Introduction
Part I: The Structure of Reasons and Normativity
1 Ralph Wedgwood: The Unity of Normativity
2 Mark Schroeder: The Unity of Reasons
3 Shyam Nair and John Horty: The Logic of Reasons
4 Aaron Bronfman and J. L. Dowell: The Language of Ought, and Reasons
5 John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor: Reflections on the Ideology of Reasons
Part II: Reasons, Motivation, and Action Explanation
6 Hille Paakkunainen: Internalism and Externalism about Reasons
7 David McNaughton and Piers Rawling: Motivating Reasons and Normative Reasons
8 Eric Wiland: Psychologism and Anti-psychologism about Motivating Reasons
9 Benjamin Wald and Sergio Tenenbaum: Reasons and Action Explanation
10 Bart Streumer: 1. Reasons and Ability
Part III: Reasons Fundamentalism
11 Jonas Olson: The Metaphysics of Reasons
12 Philip Stratton-Lake: Reasons Fundamentalism and Value
13 John Broome: Reasons Fundamentalism and What is Wrong with It
Part IV: Reasons Explained
14 John Brunero: Reasons, Evidence, and Explanations
15 Nicholas Southwood: Constructivism about Reasons
16 Paul Katsafanas: Constitutivism about Practical Reasons
Part V: Practical Deliberation
17 Antti Kauppinen: Practical Reasoning
18 Garrett Cullity: Weighing Reasons
19 Joshua Gert: Underdetermination by Reasons
20 Stephen Kearns: Reasons, Choices, and Responsibility
Part VI: Reasoning and Rationality
21 Jonathan Way: Reasons and Rationality
22 Corine Besson: Norms, Reasons, and Reasoning: A Guide Through Lewis Carroll's Regress Argument
23 Clayton Littlejohn: Reasons and Theoretical Rationality
Part VII: Epistemic Reasons
24 Kurt Sylvan and Ernest Sosa: The Place of Reasons in Epistemology
25 Kathrin Gluer and Asa Wikforss: Reasons for Belief and Normativity
26 Errol Lord: Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters
Part VIII: Types and Sources of Reasons for Belief
27 Declan Smithies: Reasons and Perception
28 Sanford Goldberg: Reasons and Testimony
29 Jonathan L. Kvanvig: Knowledge, Understanding, and Reasons for Belief
30 Andrew Reisner: Pragmatic Reasons for Belief
Part IX: Types and Sources of Reasons for Action
31 Niko Kolodny: Instrumental Reasons
32 Douglas W. Portmore: Teleological Reasons
33 Andrew Sepielli: Subjective and Objective Reasons
34 Roger Crisp: Prudential and Moral Reasons
35 Krister Bykvist: Agent-relative and Agent-neutral Reasons
36 Pekka Vayrynen: Reasons and Moral Principles
Part X: Reasons Difficult to Categorize
37 Ulrike Heuer: Reasons to Intend
38 Christine Tappolet: Reasons and Emotions
39 Andrew McGonigal: Aesthetic Reasons
Part XI: Skepticism about Reasons
40 Caitrin Donovan, Cordelia Fine, and Jeanette Kennett: Reliable and Unreliable Judgments about Reasons
41 Terence Cuneo: The Evolutionary Challenge to Knowing Moral Reasons
Part XII: Normativity, Meaning, and the Mind
42 Hannah Ginsborg: Normativity and Concepts
43 David Liebesman: The Normativity of Meaning
44 Anandi Hattiangadi: Normativity and Intentionality


Daniel Star is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Boston University, and author of Knowing Better: Virtue, Deliberation, and Normative Ethics (OUP, 2015).