OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

ISBN : 9780198811572

参考価格(税込): 
¥8,217
著者: 
Joshua May
ページ
288 ページ
フォーマット
Hardcover
サイズ
156 x 234 mm
刊行日
2018年05月
メール送信
印刷

There is a growing pessimism about ordinary moral thought and action in light of scientific research. The evidence seems to suggest that our moral minds are ultimately driven by mere feelings, self-interest, evolutionary pressures, simplistic heuristics, irrational biases, and a variety of extraneous factors. Even if moral knowledge and virtue are possible on this view, they are exceedingly rare or require us to resist our normal modes of moral deliberation. Joshua May digs into the scientific and philosophical literature and reveals that there is room for optimism: moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.

目次: 

Introduction
1 Empirical Pessimism
Part A: Moral Judgement and Knowledge
2 The Limits of Emotion
3 Reasoning Beyond Consequences
4 Defending Moral Judgment
5 The Difficulty of Moral Knowledge
Part B: Moral Motivation and Virtue
6 Beyond Self-Interest
7 The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs
8 Freeing Reason from Desire
9 Defending Virtuous Motivation
Conclusion
10 Cautious Optimism

著者について: 

Joshua May is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Before arriving in Birmingham, he taught for two years at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. His research is primarily at the intersection of science and ethics, with recent publications appearing in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Cognition, Journal of Medical Ethics, Philosophical Studies, and Synthese.

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