ISBN : 9780198779681
An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology, there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism about justification and whether such views are analogous to-and so face similar problems to-versions of consequentialism in ethics. This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.
Jeffrey Dunn and Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij: Introduction: Epistemic Consequentialism
1 Clayton Littlejohn: The Right in the Good
2 Nancy E. Snow: Virtue Epistemology, Epistemic Consequentialism, and Adaptive Misbeliefs
3 Hilary Kornblith: The Naturalistic Origins of Epistemic Consequentialism
4 Ralph Wedgwood: Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic
5 Julia Driver: The Global Sophisticated Epistemic Consequentialist
6 Alejandro Perez Carballo: Good Questions
7 Christopher Meacham: Can All-Accuracy Approaches Capture Evidentialist Norms?
8 Michael Caie: The Silence of Epistemic Consequentialism
9 Richard Pettigrew: The True Consequences of Epistemic Consequentialism
10 James M. Joyce: What are the Consequences of Epistemic Consequentialism?
11 Sophie Horowitz: Rational Credence and the Jamesian Goals
12 Amanda Askell: Epistemic Consequentialism and Epistemic Enkrasia
13 Jeffrey Dunn: Epistemic Free Riding