OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Contents of Visual Experience

ISBN : 9780195305296

参考価格(税込): 
¥10,010
著者: 
Susannah Siegel
ページ
232 ページ
フォーマット
Hardcover
サイズ
142 x 210 mm
刊行日
2011年04月
シリーズ
Philosophy of the Mind
メール送信
印刷

What do we see? We are visually conscious of colors and shapes, but are we also visually conscious of complex properties such as being John Malkovich? In this book, Susanna Siegel develops a framework for understanding the contents of visual experience, and argues that these contents involve all sorts of complex properties. Siegel starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. She then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. She then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kinds of properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. She goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. Siegel's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.

目次: 

INTRODUCTION: SEEING JOHN MALKOVICH
THE CONTENT VIEW
WHY DOES IT MATTER WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?
HOW CAN WE DECIDE WHETHER THE RICH CONTENT VIEW IS TRUE?
PART I: CONTENTS
1. Experiences
1.1 STATES OF SEEING AND PHENOMENAL STATES
1.2 VISUAL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES
2. : The Content View
2.1 CONTENTS AS ACCURACY CONDITIONS
2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY
2.3 A FLAW IN THE ARGUMENT FROM ACCURACY
2.4 THE ARGUMENT FROM APPEARING
2.5 TWO OBJECTIONS FROM 'LOOKS', 'APPEARS' AND THEIR COGNATES
2.6 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONTENT VIEW
3. How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?
3.1 INTROSPECTION
3.2 NATURALISTIC THEORIES OF CONTENT
3.3 THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST
PART II: PROPERTIES
4. Kinds
4.1 THE EXAMPLES
4.2 THE PREMISES
4.3 CONTENT EXTERNALISM
5. Causation
5.1 THE CAUSAL THESIS
5.2 MICHOTTE'S RESULTS
5.3 UNITY IN EXPERIENCE
5.4 NON-CAUSAL CONTENTS
5.5 RAW FEELS
5.6 NON-SENSORY EXPERIENCES
PART III: OBJECTS
CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF OBJECTS IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE
6.1 STRONG AND WEAK VERIDICALITY
6.2 THE CONTENTS OF STATES OF SEEING
6.3 THE CONTENTS OF PHENOMENAL STATES
6.4 PHENOMENAL STATES: INTERNALISM VS. PURE DISJUNCTIVISM
6.5 WHY INTERNALISM?
CHAPTER 7: SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN THE CONTENTS OF EXPERIENCE
7.1 SUBJECT-INDEPENDENCE AND PERSPECTIVAL CONNECTEDNESS
7.2 THE GOOD AND THE ODD
7.3 COMPLEX CONTENTS
7.4 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
CHAPTER 8: THE STRONG CONTENT VIEW REVISITED

著者について: 

Susanna Siegel received her PhD in Philosophy at Cornell University in 2000. She was previously John L Loeb Associate Professor of the Humanities at Harvard University, and is currently Professor of Philosophy and an affiliate of the Program in Mind, Brain and Behavior at Harvard University.

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