ISBN : 9780190251550
No one wants to be treated merely as a means-"used," in a sense. But just what is this repugnant treatment? Audi's point of departure is Kant's famous principle that we must treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Treatment of these kinds is conduct, a complex three-dimensional notion whose central elements are action, its motivation, and the manner of its performance. He shows how the notions of treating persons as ends and, by contrast, merely as means, can be anchored outside Kant and clarified in ways that enhance their usefulness both in ethical theory and in practical ethics, where they have much intuitive force. Audi constructs an account of treatment of persons-of what it is, how it differs from mere interpersonal action, and what ethical standards govern it. In accounting for such treatment, the book develops a wider conception of ethics than is commonly implicit in utilitarian, deontological, or virtue theories. These results contribute to ethical theory, but in its discussion of diverse narrative examples of moral and immoral conduct, the book also contributes to normative ethics. Audi's theory of conduct takes account of motivational elements that are not traits of character and of behavioral elements that are not manifestations of virtue or vice. Here it goes beyond the leading virtue approaches. The theory also advances rule ethics by framing wider conception of moral behavior-roughly, of acting morally. The results advance both normative ethics and ethical theory. For moral philosophy, the book frames conceptions, articulates distinctions, and formulates principles; and for practical ethics, it provides a multitude of cases that illustrate both the scope of moral responsibility and the normative standards for living up to it.
Preface and Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part One
The Ethics of Protecting Persons
Chapter 1
The Instrumental Treatment of Persons
Means and Ends
Instrumental Versus End-Regarding Treatment
Treating Solely as a Means versus Merely as a Means
Chapter 2
Instrumental Treatment as Human Conduct
The Motivation and Controllability of Merely Instrumental Conduct
Constraints, Moral Character, and Self-Control
Motivation, Constraints, and the Appraisal of Character
Chapter 3
Action, Treatment and Conduct
Action, Endeavor, and Consequence
Two Levels of Behavioral Description
Conduct as a Morally Important Category
Manners of Action Versus Actions as Defined by Manner
Chapter 4
The Wrong-Making Character of Merely Instrumental Treatment
Thick and Thin Moral Questions
Substantive and Contrastive Views of Merely Instrumental Treatment
Persons as Ends Versus Good Ends for Persons
Internal and External Goods for Persons
Part Two
The Ethics of Respecting Persons
Chapter 5
Treating Others as Ends in Themselves
Caring about the Good of Others
Two Kinds of Normativity
Descriptive Grounds of End-regarding Treatment
Chapter 6
End-Regarding Treatment and Respect for Persons
Good Deeds, Good Reasons, and Good Conduct
End-Regarding Treatment, Intention, and Interpersonal Behavior
The Particularity of Persons and the Interchangeability of Means
Chapter 7
Autonomy and the Moral Significance of Our Self-Conceptions
Psychological Dispositions and the Basis of Consent
Respect for Persons, Point of View, and Informed Rational Desire
End-Regarding Treatment and Respecting Moral Rights
Conduct Toward Persons versus Behavior Affecting Them
Chapter 8
Conduct, Intention, and Will
Motivational Self-Control and the Scope of Intentions
The Manner of Interpersonal Conduct
Moral Requirements and the Content of Intention
Conduct Requirements and the Love Commandments
Conclusion
Index
