ISBN : 9780199584086
Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: *traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc; *new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; *foundational questions in decision-theory; *confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; *topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; *topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and *work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.
1. Putting a Value on Beauty
2. Skeptical Success
3. Seeing What You're Doing
4. Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Uniqueness and Self-Locating Belief
5. Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes
6. There Are No Rational Pairs of Contradictory Beliefs (Whatever Some Philosophers of Language Say)
7. Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence
SPECIAL THEME: SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY GUEST EDITOR: ALVIN GOLDMAN
8. Systems-Oriented Social Epistemology
9. The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory
10. Can There Be Institutional Virtues?
11. Selective Trust in Testimony: Children's Evaluation of the Message, the Speaker and the Speech Act
12. What Should We Do When We Disagree?
13. Reconsidering Authority: Scientific Expertise, Bounded Rationality, and Epistemic Backtracking