OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information

ISBN : 9780199582945

参考価格(税込): 
¥4,103
著者: 
Brian Skyrms
ページ
208 ページ
フォーマット
Paperback
サイズ
135 x 202 mm
刊行日
2010年04月
メール送信
印刷

Brian Skyrms presents a fascinating exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses a variety of tools - theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning - to investigate how meaning and communication develop. He shows how signaling games themselves evolve, and introduces a new model of learning with invention. The juxtaposition of atomic signals leads to complex signals, as the natural product of gradual process. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life. Information is transmitted, but it is also processed in various ways. That is how we think - signals run around a very complicated signaling network. Signaling is a key ingredient in the evolution of teamwork, in the human but also in the animal world, even in micro-organisms. Communication and co-ordination of action are different aspects of the flow of information, and are both effected by signals.

目次: 

Introduction
1. Signals
2. Signals in Nature
3. The Flow of Information
4. Evolution
5. Evolution in Lewis Signaling Games
6. Deception
7. Learning
8. Learning in Lewis Signaling Games
9. Generalizing Signaling Games: Synonyms, Bottlenecks and Other Mismatches
10. Inventing New Signals
11. Networks I: Information Processing
12. Complex Signals and Compositionality
13. Networks II: Teamwork
14. Learning to Network

著者について: 

Brian Skyrms is a Distinguished Professor of logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California Irvine, and Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University.

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