ISBN : 9780199599325
Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003). Various themes of Williams's work are explored and taken in new directions. In their essays, Brad Hooker, Philip Pettit, and Susan Wolf are all concerned with Williams's work on the viability or wisdom of systematic moral theory, and his criticism, in particular, of moral theory's preoccupation with impartiality. David Enoch, Joseph Raz, and R. Jay Wallace address Williams's work on moral luck, and his insistence that moral appraisals bear a disquieting sensitivity to various kinds of luck. Wallace makes further connections between moral luck and the 'non-identity problem' in reproductive ethics. Michael Smith and Ulrike Heuer investigate Williams's defence of 'internalism' about reasons for action, which makes our reasons for action a function of our desires, projects, and psychological dispositions. Smith attempts to plug a gap in Williams's theory which is created by Williams's deference to imagination, while Heuer connects these issues to Williams's accommodation of 'thick' ethical concepts as a source of knowledge and action-guidingness. John Broome examines Williams's less-known work on the other central normative concept, 'ought'. Jonathan Dancy takes a look at Williams's work on moral epistemology and intuitionism, comparing and contrasting his work with that of John McDowell, and Gerald Lang explores Williams's work on equality, discrimination, and interspecies relations in order to reach the conclusion, similar to Williams's, that 'speciesism' is very unlike racism or sexism.
3. Theory versus Anti-Theory in Ethics
4. The Inescapability of Consequentialism
5. "One Thought Too Many": Love, Morality and the Ordering of Commitment
6. Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency'
7. Agency and Luck
8. Justification, Regret, and Moral Complaint: Looking Forward and Looking Backward on (and in) Human Life'
REASONS AND 'OUGHT'
9. A Puzzle about Internal Reasons
10. Thick Concepts and Internal Reasons
11. Williams on Ought
INTUITIONISM AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE
12. McDowell, Williams, and Intuitionism
13. Discrimination, Partial Concern, and Arbitrariness