ISBN : 9780199609192
Intuitions may seem to play a fundamental role in philosophy: but their role and their value have been challenged recently. What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science-in thought experiments, for instance-as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This collection brings together leading philosophers, from early to late career, to tackle such questions. It presents the state of the art thinking on the topic.
PART ONE: THE ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANDING OF INTUITIONS
The Rational Roles of Intuition
Intuitions: Their Nature and Probative Value
Empirical Evidence for Rationalism?
Moderate Intuitionism: A Metasemantic Account
Intuition, 'Intuition', Concepts and the A Priori
PART TWO: INTUITIONS IN DISCIPLINES OR SUB-DISCIPLINES
Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps
Novice Thought Experiments
Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments
Linguistic Intuitions in Context: A Defence of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism
PART THREE: CHALLENGES
The Challenge of Sticking with Intuitions Through Thick and Thin
Who Needs Intuitions? Two Experimentalist Critiques
Grasp of Essences Versus Intuitions: An Uneven Contest
X-Phi Without Intuitions?