ISBN : 9780199678051
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Notes on Contributors
Introduction
1. The Relational Nature of the Good
2. Value and Reasons to Favor
3. On Being Social in Metaethics
4. Reasons, Commitment, and the Will
5. Two Dualisms of Practical Reason
6. On the (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge
7. Moral Error Theory and the Belief Problem
8. Truth Conditions and the Meaning of Ethical Terms
9. Properties for Nothing, Facts for Free? Expressivism's Deflationary Gambit
10. Believing in Expressivism
11. Tempered Expressivism
Index
