ISBN : 9780199347582
A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts.
Contributors
Introduction
Part I
1. How to Insult a Philosopher
Michael Ridge
2. Expressivism, Non-Declaratives, and Success-Conditional Semantics
Daniel Boisvert
3. Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways? Moral Thought, Open Questions and Moral Motivation
David Copp
4. Attitudinal Requirements for Moral Thought and Language: Noncognitive Type-Generality
Ryan Hay
5. Diachronic Hybrid Moral Realism
Jon Tresan
6. The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement
Stephen Finlay
7. Hybrid Expressivism: How to Think About Meaning.
John Eriksson
Part II
8. Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression and Implicature
Guy Fletcher
9. Pure versus Hybrid Expressivism and the Enigma of Conventional Implicature
Stephen Barker
10. (How) is Ethical Neo- Expressivism a Hybrid View?
Dorit Bar-On, Matthew Chrisman and Jim Sias
11. Why Go Hybrid? A Cognitivist Alternative to Hybrid Theories of Normative Judgment
Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter
12. Truth In Hybrid Semantics
Mark Schroeder
Bibliography
Index
