ISBN : 9780198841449
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
1 David Enoch: How Principles Ground
2 Eric Sampson: The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement
3 Jussi Suikkanen: Contextualism, Moral Disagreement, and Proposition Clouds
4 Guy Fletcher: Taking Prudence Seriously
5 Jennifer Hawkins: Internalism and Prudential Value
6 Michael Milona and Mark Schroeder: Desiring under the Proper Guise
7 David Killoren: Infinitism about Cross-Domain Conflict
8 Zoe Johnson King: We Can Have Our Buck and Pass It, Too
9 Michael G. Titelbaum: Reason without Reasons For
10 Christopher Howard: The Fundamentality of Fit
