ISBN : 9780198823452
Among the many attractive features of democracy is its tendency to track the truth, at least under certain idealized assumptions. That basic result has been known since 1785, when Condorcet published his famous Jury Theorem, but its assumptions have been regarded as too restrictive to apply to the real world. In An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, Goodin and Spiekermann show that those assumptions can be substantially weakened while preserving those same truth-tracking properties. They discuss different ways of making the theorem genuinely applicable to the real world, and use the theorem to assess how various familiar political institutions and practices might best take advantage of the truth tracking potential of majoritarian democracy. The book concludes with a discussion of how epistemic democracy might be undermined, as illustrated by the Trump and Brexit campaigns.
1 Introduction
Part I: The Condorcet Jury Theorem
2 The Classic Framework
3 Extensions
4 Limitations
5 Independence Revisited
Part II: Epistemic Enhancement
6 Improving Individual Competence
7 Diversity
8 Division of Epistemic Labour
9 Discussion and Deliberation
Part III: Political Practices
10 Respecting Tradition
11 Following Leaders
12 Taking Cues
13 Pluralism: Differing Values & Priorities
14 Factionalism: Differing Interests
Part IV: Structures of Government
15 Epistocracy or Democracy
16 Direct versus Representative Democracy
17 Institutional Hindrances to Epistemic Success
18 Institutional Aids to Epistemic Success
Part V: Conclusions
19 The Relation Between Truth and Politics, Once Again
20 Headline Findings, Central Implications
21 Epilogue: What About Trump and Brexit?
Appendices
A1 Key to Notation
A2 Estimating Group Competence by Monte Carlo Simulation