ISBN : 9780198797074
Moral rationalism takes human reason and human rationality to be the key elements in an explanation of the nature of morality, moral judgment, and moral knowledge. This volume explores the resources of this rich philosophical tradition. It addresses questions such as whether and how moral knowledge could be a priori, whether and how rationalism can accommodate the growing empirical evidence of the role of emotion in moral cognition, and whether and how moral requirements can be grounded in practical rationality. Together the essays demonstrate that moral rationalism identifies not a single philosophical position but rather a family of philosophical positions, which resemble traditional rationalism, as exemplified by Kant, to varying degrees.
1 Francois Schroeter, Karen Jones, and Laura Schroeter: Introduction
2 Julia Markovits: Humanity as an End in Itself
3 Michael Smith: Three Kinds of Moral Rationalism
4 Karl Schafer: Constitutivism about Reasons: Autonomy and Understanding
5 Nicholas Southwood: Constructing Practical Normativity
6 Sarah Buss: Moral Requirements and Permissions, and the Requirements and Permissions of Reason
7 Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter: Reasons and Justifiability
8 Mark van Roojen: Rationalist Metaphysics, Semantics and Metasemantics
9 Tristram McPherson: Naturalistic Moral Realism, Rationalism,and Non-Fundamental Epistemology
10 Ram Neta: The Motivating Power of the A Priori Obvious
11 Garrett Cullity: Stupid Goodness
12 Alison Hills: What Does it Take to Act for Moral Reasons?
13 Karen Jones: Towards a Trajectory-Dependent Model of (Human) Rational Agency
14 Joshua May: The Limits of Emotion in Moral Judgment