A Naive Realist Theory of Colour

ISBN : 9780198755364

Keith Allen
224 Pages
153 x 234 mm
Pub date
Dec 2016
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A Naive Realist Theory of Colour defends the view that colours are mind-independent properties of things in the environment, that are distinct from properties identified by the physical sciences. This view stands in contrast to the long-standing and wide-spread view amongst philosophers and scientists that colours don't really exist - or at any rate, that if they do exist, then they are radically different from the way that they appear. It is argued that a naive realist theory of colour best explains how colours appear to perceiving subjects, and that this view is not undermined either by reflecting on variations in colour perception between perceivers and across perceptual conditions, or by our modern scientific understanding of the world. A Naive Realist Theory of Colour also illustrates how our understanding of what colours are has far-reaching implications for wider questions about the nature of perceptual experience, the relationship between mind and world, the problem of consc


1 Introduction: Naive Realist Theories of Colour
2 Mind-Independence
3 Perceptual Variation
4 Distinctness
5 Causation
6 Structural Properties of the Colours
7 Revelation
8 Realism
9 Conclusion: Consciousness and the Manifest Image

About the author: 

Keith Allen is Senior Lecturer at the Univeristy of York. He was previously a Jacbosen Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy, London, and is interested in colour, the philosophy of perception, early modern philosophy, and phenomenology.

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