ISBN : 9780198784654
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Russ Shafer-Landau: Introduction
1 J. L. Dowell: The Metaethical Insignificance of Moral Twin Earth
2 Philip Stratton-Lake: Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding
3 Guy Fletcher: Moral Testimony: Once More with Feeling
4 Graham Oddie: Fitting Attitudes, Finkish Goods, and Value Appearances
5 Brian Hedden: Does MITE Make Right? On Decision-Making Under Normative Uncertainty
6 Agnes Callard: Proleptic Reasons
7 Justin Snedegar: Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements
8 Connie S. Rosati: Agents and Shmagents: An Essay on Agency and Normativity
9 Matthew Silverstein: Teleology and Normativity
10 Billy Dunaway: Expressivism and Normative Metaphysics
11 Andrew Sepielli: Moral Realism without Moral Metaphysics
12 Sharon Street: Objectivity and Truth-You'd Better Rethink It
