OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind

ISBN : 9780199596317

Price(incl.tax): 
¥6,391
Author: 
Brian McLaughlin; Ansgar Beckermann; Sven Walter
Pages
832 Pages
Format
Paperback
Size
178 x 247 mm
Pub date
Jan 2011
Series
Oxford Handbooks in Philosophy
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The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of the mind in the natural world: its ontological status, how it fits into the causal fabric of the universe, and the nature of consciousness. The third section focuses on the much-debated subjects of content and intentionality. The fourth section examines a variety of mental capacities, including memory, imagination, and emotion. The fifth section looks at epistemic issues, in particular regarding knowledge of one's own and other minds. The volume concludes with a section on self, personhood, and agency. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind will be an invaluable resource for advanced students and scholars of philosophy, and also for researchers in neighbouring disciplines seeking a high-level survey of the state of the art in this flourishing field.

Index: 

I. THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE
1. Mental Causation
2. The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
3. Dualism
4. Epiphenomenalism
5. Anomalous Monism
6. Nonreductive Materialsim
7. Functionalism
8. What Is Property Physicalism?
9. What Is the Physical?
10. Idealism
11. Panpsychism
II. THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNES IN NATURE
12. Subjectivity
13. Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
14. Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
15. Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
16. The Explanatory Gap
17. Phenomenal Concepts
18. The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
III. INTENTIONALITY AND THEORIES OF MENTAL CONTENT
19. Intentional Systems Theory
20. Wide Content
21. Narrow Content
22. Information-theoretic Semantics
23. Biosemantics
24. A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
25. The Normativity of the Intentional
26. Concepts and Possession Conditions
27. The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
28. Intentionalism
29. The Content of Perceptual Experience
30. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
IV. SELF, UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
31. Selves
32. Unity of Consciousness
33. Personal Identity and Metaphysics
V. VARIETY OF MENTAL ABILITIES
34. Imagination
35. Thinking
36. Language and Thought
37. Consciousness and Reference
38. Memory
39. Emotions: Motivating Feelings
40. Intention and Intentional Action
VI. EPISTEMIC ISSUES
41. Folk Psychology
42. Other Minds
43. Introspection
44. Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge
45. Self-deception

About the author: 

Brian McLaughlin is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers ; Ansgar Beckermann is Professor of Philosophy at University of Bielefeld, Germany ; Sven Walter is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Bielefeld, Germany

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