OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution

ISBN : 9780199730858

Price(incl.tax): 
¥25,704
Author: 
Gary E. Bolton; Rachel T. A. Croson
Pages
432 Pages
Format
Hardcover
Size
190 x 255 mm
Pub date
Oct 2012
Series
Oxford Handbooks in Economics
Send mail
Print

Individuals, groups, and societies all experience conflict, and attempt to resolve it in numerous ways. This handbook brings together scholars from multiple disciplines to offer perspectives on the current state and future challenges in negotiation and conflict resolution. It will serve as an aid to scholars in identifying new research topics, provide a guide to current debates, and identify complementarities between approaches taken by different disciplines and the insights which those approaches generate. Leading researchers from Economics, Psychology, Organizational Behavior, Policy, and other fields have contributed chapters. The volume is organized to purposefully juxtapose contributions from different fields to enable cross-fertilization between the disciplines and to generate new and creative approaches to studying the topic. These chapters provide a lens into current scholarship, and a window into the potential future of this field. The confluence of research perspectives represented will identify further synergies and advances in our understanding of conflict resolution.

Index: 

1 Introduction
Rachel Croson and Gary Bolton
2 Communication in Bargaining Experiments
Gary Charness
3 Communication Media: for Negotiation Process and Outcome
Zoe I. Barsness
4 Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality
Neeru Paharia, Lucas C. Coffman and Max H. Bazerman
5 Deception in Negotiations: The Role of Emotions
Francesca Gino and Catherine Shea
6 Communicating Frames in Negotiations
Kathleen L. McGinn and Markus Noth
7 Models of Coalition Formation in Multilateral Negotiations
Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay and Kalyan Chatterjee
8 Gaming with Fairness: Some Conjectures on Behavior in Alternating Offer Bargaining Experiments
Rami Zwick and Vincent Mak
9 Wages, Inequity and Questions about Incentive Schemes
Peter Werner
10 Social Comparison in Negotiation
Jan Crusius and Thomas Mussweiler
11 The Utility of Relationships in Negotiation
Ashley D. Brown and Jared R. Curhan
12 Connectivity and Cooperation
Nancy R. Buchan, Enrique Fatas and Gianluca Grimalda
13 Trust, Distrust and Bargaining
Iris Bohnet and Stephan Meier
14 Evolution and Breakdown of Trust in Continuous Time
Amnon Rapoport and Ryan O. Murphy
15 Contracting
Brit Grosskopf
16 Negotiating Reputations
Axel Ockenfels and Paul Resnick
17 Bargaining and Negotiations: What should experimentalists explore more thoroughly?
Werner Guth
18 Biased Beliefs in Negotiation
George Wu, Richard Larrick, and Raegan Tennant
19 Bluffing, Agonism, and the Role of Overconfidence in Negotiation
Samuel A. Swift and Don Moore
20 Risk in Negotiation: Judgments of Likelihood and Value
Richard P. Larrick and George Wu
21 Heterogeneity in Ultimatum Bargaining: The Role of Information, Individual Characteristics, and Emotions
Angela C. M. de Oliveira and Catherine C. Eckel
22 A Model of When to Negotiate: Why Women Don't Ask
Linda Babcock, Julia Bear, and Hannah Riley Bowles
23 Explaining and Predicting Cultural Differences in Negotiation
Michele J. Gelfand, Laura Severance, C. Ashley Fulmer and May Al Dabbagh
24 Bargaining Games with Joint Production
Emin Karagozo?lu
25 Upstream and Downstream Negotiation Research
Leigh Thompson, Brian Lucas, and Erika Richardson

About the author: 

Gary E. Bolton is Schwartz Professor of Business, Penn State University. Rachel T. A. Croson is Professor and Director of The Negotiations Center, School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences and School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas.

The price listed on this page is the recommended retail price for Japan. When a discount is applied, the discounted price is indicated as “Discount price”. Prices are subject to change without notice.