ISBN : 9780199606382
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
1. Mind-Independence Without the Mystery: Why Quasi-Realists Can't Have It Both Ways
2. How Much Realism? Evolved Thinkers and Normative Concepts
3. Parfit's Case against Subjectivism
4. Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare
5. Moral Knowledge and Experience
6. Passing the Deontic Buck
7. The Accidental Error Theorist
8. Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
9. A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism
10. Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency
11. Why be An Internalist about Reasons?
12. Instrumental Rationality