OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Agency and Joint Attention

ISBN : 9780199988341

Price(incl.tax): 
¥20,790
Author: 
Janet Metcalfe; Herbert S. Terrace
Pages
368 Pages
Format
Hardcover
Size
167 x 243 mm
Pub date
Sep 2013
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Human infants do not seem to be born with concepts of self or joint attention. One basic goal of Agency and Joint Attention is to unravel how these abilities originate. One approach that has received a lot of recent attention is social. Some argue that by virtue of an infant's intense eye gaze with her mother, she is able, by the age of four months, to establish a relationship with her mother that differentiates between "me" and "you." At about twelve months, the infant acquires the non-verbal ability to share attention with her mother or other caregivers. Although the concepts of self and joint attention are nonverbal and uniquely human, the question remains, how do we establish metacognitive control of these abilities? A tangential question is whether nonhuman animals develop abilities that are analogous to self and joint attention. Much of this volume is devoted to the development of metacognition of self and joint attention in experiments on the origin of consciousness, knowing oneself, social referencing, joint action, the neurological basis of joint attention, the role of joint action, mirror neurons, phenomenology, and cues for agency.

Index: 

Contributors
Introduction
Herbert Terrace
Chapter 1
Becoming Human: Why Two Minds are Better Than One
Herbert S. Terrace
Chapter 2
How Joint Is The Joint Attention Of Apes And Human Infants?
Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call
Chapter 3
The Comparative Delusion: The 'Behavioristic'/ 'Mentalistic' Dichotomy in Comparative Theory Of Mind Research
Derek C. Penn and Daniel J. Povinelli
Chapter 4
Behavior-Reading Versus Mentalizing In Animals
Logan Fletcher and Peter Carruthers
Chapter 5
On Knowing and Being Known in the 4-Month Origins of Disorganized Attachment: An Emerging Presymbolic Theory Of Mind
Beatrice Beebe, Sara Markese, Lorraine Bahrick, Frank Lachmann, Karen Buck,
Henian Chen, Patricia Cohen, Howard Andrews, and Joseph Jaffe
Chapter 6
Gaze Following And Agency In Human Infancy
Andrew N. Meltzoff and Rechele Brooks
Chapter 7
Ostensive Communication and Cultural Learning: The Natural Pedagogy Hypothesis
Gyorgy Gergely
Chapter 8
Embodied Attention in Infant Pointing
Fabia Franco
Chapter 9
Understanding the Structure of Communicative Interactions in Infancy
Athena Vouloumanos and Kristine H. Onishi
Chapter 10
Cognition in Action: A New Look at the Cortical Motor System
Vittorio Gallese and Corrado Sinigaglia
Chapter 10
Early Sensitivity to Emotion Cues - Precursors of Social Referencing?
Stefanie Hoehl
Chapter 11
Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action
Anne Bockler and Natalie Sebanz
Chapter 12
Do You See What I See? The Neural Bases of Joint Attention
Elizabeth Redcay and Rebecca Saxe
Chapter 12
Linking Joint Attention and Joint Action
Anne Bockler and Natalie Sebanz
Chapter 14
'Knowing' That the Self is the Agent
Janet Metcalfe
Chapter 15
Cues To Agency: Time Can Tell
Robrecht Van Der Wel and Gunther Knoblich
Chapter 16
The Meaning of Actions: Crosstalk between Procedural and Declarative Action Knowledge
Wolfgang Prinz, Christiane Diefenbach, and Anne Springer
Chapter 17
The Three Pillars of Volition: Phenomenal States, Ideomotor Processing, and The Skeletal Muscle System
Ezequiel Morsella Tanaz Molapour, and Margaret T. Lynn
Chapter 18
The Function of Consciousness in Controlling Behavior
Sara Steele and Hakwan Lau
Chapter 19
Sense of Agency: Many Facets, Multiple Sources
Elisabeth Pacherie

About the author: 

Janet Metcalfe, Betsy Sparrow and Herb TerraceAll at Department of Psychology, Columbia University

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